The Brief
India has issued the Natural Gas (Supply Regulation) Order 2026 under the Essential Commodities Act, imposing mandatory rationing that overrides all existing commercial gas contracts. The order guarantees full supply to households, transport, and LPG production while cutting refinery allocations to 65% and curtailing petrochemical and power plant deliveries, as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz — through which 69% of India’s LNG imports flow — has reduced shipments from its largest supplier to zero.
The Report
The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas notified the order late on March 9, effective immediately upon gazette publication. It establishes a four-tier priority system: domestic piped gas, CNG, LPG production, and pipeline operations receive 100% of their six-month average consumption. Fertiliser plants receive 70%, restricted to fertiliser production only. Tea, manufacturing, and other grid-connected industrial consumers receive 80%. Petrochemical facilities, power plants, and refineries absorb the deepest cuts, with refineries directed to reduce consumption to approximately 65%.
The order names specific companies facing curtailment — ONGC Petro Additions Limited, GAIL’s Pata petrochemical complex, and Reliance Industries’ oil-to-chemicals operations. State-run GAIL coordinates the physical diversion of volumes in conjunction with the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, which sets pooled pricing for redirected gas. All recipients must accept the notified price through legal undertaking. Resale of diverted gas is prohibited.
The trigger was the collapse of LNG shipments through the Strait of Hormuz following US-Israeli military strikes on Iran in late February. Iran’s IRGC effectively halted tanker traffic through the strait. QatarEnergy declared force majeure on March 4 after attacks on its Ras Laffan facilities — one of the world’s largest LNG export hubs. By March 5, GAIL announced that LNG allocation under its Petronet contract had fallen to zero.
India’s exposure is acute. Nearly 69% of LNG imports in 2025 — approximately 17.5 million tonnes — transited the Strait from Qatar, the UAE, and Oman. Two terminals, Kochi and Chhara, are 100% dependent on Hormuz-routed supply. Petronet LNG’s Dahej terminal, the country’s largest, draws 76% of its volume through the strait. Asian spot LNG prices have nearly doubled, from roughly $10 to $24–25 per MMBtu.
The ground-level effects arrived before the regulation order did. Approximately 20% of Mumbai’s hotels have closed. Pune’s municipal crematoriums shut temporarily after propane and butane restrictions took effect on March 5. Black-market LPG cylinders priced at ₹910 are selling for ₹2,000–3,000. Commercial cylinder booking times have extended from 21 to 25 days. The Federation of Hotel and Restaurant Association of India reported “widespread disruption at the ground level.”
Petroleum Minister Hardeep Singh Puri characterised the situation as comfortable, stating that energy imports remain in “full flow from all non-Hormuz routes” and that household CNG and PNG supplies are “fully secure.” The government has increased non-Hormuz imports from 55% to 70% of the total and boosted domestic LPG production by approximately 10% — though India produces only 12.8 million tonnes against annual consumption of 31.3 million tonnes, limiting the effect of that increase. Officials are evaluating alternative sourcing from Norway and the United States. Prime Minister Modi directed the Cabinet that “common man should not be impacted.”
India’s LNG-specific strategic reserves provide an estimated 9–12 days of buffer — below Japan’s 18 days and the international benchmark recommendation of 15–20 days.
The Angle
The rationing order is significant less for what it does than for what it reveals about the architecture it is attempting to hold together. India built an energy strategy around a 7% natural gas share in its energy mix — already a quarter of the global average — and then sourced 69% of that gas through a single maritime chokepoint. The vulnerability was not hidden. Elara Securities’ analysis of terminal-level exposure was published before the crisis hit. The PNGRB’s demand projections through 2040 assumed continued access to exactly the supply corridor that has now been severed. The strategy was to grow dependence on a resource routed through the most geopolitically fragile passage on Earth, and to do so without strategic reserves that could survive a disruption lasting more than a fortnight.
What the order actually demonstrates is the speed at which a modern economy reverts to administered allocation when the supply assumptions underneath it fail. Within eleven days of the first strikes, India moved from market pricing to government-directed rationing, overriding commercial contracts by legal mandate. That is not a policy response. It is the market being suspended because the market cannot solve the problem it was built on top of.
The minister’s assurance that the situation is “comfortable” is doing specific work. Household supply is being maintained — that part is accurate. But the mechanism for maintaining it is the progressive strangulation of industrial demand: refineries at 65%, petrochemicals curtailed to zero from some sources, fertiliser plants capped at 70% of recent consumption during planting season. The comfort of the domestic consumer is being purchased with the operational capacity of the industrial base. That equation holds for weeks. It does not hold for months. And the experts who have spoken publicly — Sudhir Bisht, Prashant Vasisht — have been notably precise about where the timeline breaks: three months, after which the disruption becomes systemic.
The infrastructure of the world’s fifth-largest economy was built on geography it does not control. This week, the invoice arrived.
The distance between “comfortable position” and rationing by emergency decree is one strait, eleven days, and a set of assumptions that were never tested until now.